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INTRODUCTION TO THE HANDBOOK   
The aim of this handbook is to help increase resilience in 
surveillance societies. It is aimed at six main groups of 
stakeholders: policy-makers and regulators, consultancies, 
service providers, the media, civil society organisations and 
the public.  
The term “surveillance society” came into widespread use, at 
least in Europe, with the publication of a report produced for 
the UK Information Commissioner in 2006. Based on that report, 
then Commissioner Richard Thomas warned in August 2006 
that the UK was “sleepwalking into a surveillance society”, by 
which he meant not only that surveillance was becoming 
ubiquitous in the UK, but that most people were unaware of its 
ubiquity, that there was little public debate about its ubiquity 
and its effects and how negative effects could be countered.  
The report, prepared by the Surveillance Studies Network 
(SSN), defined surveillance as follows: “Where we find 
purposeful, routine, systematic and focused attention paid to 
personal details, for the sake of control, entitlement, 
management, influence or protection, we are looking at 
surveillance.” It added that “The collection and processing of 
information about persons can be used for purposes of 
influencing their behaviour or providing services.”  But 
surveillance is more than that. Intelligence agencies and 
probably some companies not only use surveillance to 
discover what their enemies and customers are doing, but also 
to uncover the activities of their competitors, and even their 
“friends” and allies.  
The IRISS consortium has defined a surveillance society as one 
in which the use of surveillance technologies has become 
virtually ubiquitous and in which such use has become widely 
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(but not uniformly) accepted by the public as endemic and 
justified by its proponents as necessary for economic, security 
or other reasons. Even if there are democratic procedures, a 
surveillance society is one in which there is a parallel system of 
power exercised by large, oligarchic companies and 
intelligence agencies over which effective oversight and 
control are largely illusory.  
With regard to resilience, there are many definitions, but in the 
context of resilience in a surveillance society, IRISS defines it as 
“the ability of people (individuals and groups) and 
organisations to adapt to and/or resist surveillance, 
recognising that, while some forms of surveillance may be 
acceptable or tolerable, others pose a serious challenge to 
our fundamental rights”. 
This handbook is divided into three main parts. Part One 
provides some background on resilience in surveillance 
societies. It defines the terms and identifies features of 
resilience and today’s surveillance society.  
Part Two lays out a set of questions addressed to each of the 
stakeholder groups. The questions are intended to provoke 
consideration of a proposed or existing surveillance system, 
technology, practice or other initiative, whether the 
surveillance system is truly necessary or proportionate, and 
whether stakeholders are being consulted.  
Part Three offers a list of measures that can be taken to 
increase resilience in a surveillance society and to restrict the 
scope of surveillance systems to what can be legitimately 
justified and to minimise the impacts of surveillance systems on 
the individual, groups and society.   
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While the stakeholders listed here are not the only ones 
concerned with resilience and surveillance, they have key 
roles in the fabric of socio-economic and political features of 
democratic societies. As such, these stakeholders can be 
considered as multipliers: by targeting them, this Handbook 
might benefit – indirectly – a wider group of stakeholders. 
The handbook is not intended to be or replace a full-fledged 
surveillance impact assessment (SIA) or privacy impact 
assessment (PIA). However, the handbook may stimulate 
awareness that an SIA and/or PIA should be undertaken, 
especially in the context of a mass surveillance system. 
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PART ONE: CONTEXT    
Contextualising surveillance and surveillance societies  
This section outlines briefly the nature of surveillance, provides 
some key examples of surveillance technologies, 
interdependencies, surveillance players and their relationships, 
and illustrates the nature of surveillance societies. 
A surveillance society is one in which surveillance has become 
virtually ubiquitous. Even if there are democratic procedures, 
effective oversight and control are extremely difficult in a 
surveillance society in which power is exercised by large 
companies, state organisations and intelligence agencies. 
Surveillance, democracy and resilience 
Surveillance can potentially offer many benefits to the state, 
private companies, local communities and even individuals. A 
democratic state can employ surveillance societies in order to 
help guard its citizens from terrorism, subversion and crime, to 
monitor its borders and to protect its national interests. Private 
companies can use data gathered in order to understand 
customers and users better, to develop better products and 
services and to tailor services to individuals. Communities can 
use surveillance to help make their localities safer or to identify 
those causing problems for others. Individuals can use 
surveillance to guard their properties or their loved ones. 
Yet, whatever it’s acknowledged benefits, surveillance may 
itself pose a threat to individuals, communities and societies, 
because of its ubiquity, intensity and use of personally 
identifiable information. These qualities of surveillance may 
erode privacy and a host of freedoms, rights and values that it 
is designed to protect, including democracy itself. 
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Surveillance has deleterious effects. It may affect privacy. If it is 
not transparent and accountable, it may erode trust, societal 
cohesion and even democracy itself. Surveillance’s ability to 
discriminate amongst members of the public or social groups 
may have implications for social integration and societal 
solidarity. Surveillance also affects human dignity and 
challenges human autonomy. It affects the way individuals 
move within societies, associate with others, think, express 
themselves and engage lawfully in political activity. 
Democratic practices and the working of democratic 
institutions depend upon the realisation of principles, freedoms 
and the rule of law that surveillance is likely to threaten. 
Insofar as a society is democratic, its citizens have some 
choice as to how their government behaves and what is 
permitted of companies, organisations and others. Citizens 
may use the electoral process or engage in public debate in 
order to influence governments and policy- makers. Because 
of the significant potential dangers involved in surveillance, 
surveillance policy and practice require particular public 
scrutiny. But as well as responding in an ad hoc fashion to 
problems with surveillance as they arise, societies may wish to 
put in place regulatory and other mechanisms in order to 
provide continuous safeguards against surveillance. Indeed, to 
some extent, this already happens. Yet one may ask how 
effective such existing safeguards actually are, and question 
the degree to which societies are currently “resilient” to the 
negative effects of surveillance.  
 Resilience to surveillance requires ways of preventing, 
mitigating, remedying and “bouncing forward” from the 
negative effects of surveillance. Resilience strategies include 
ways of anticipating the use of surveillance and raising the 
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awareness of the public. They require political actors, policy-
makers and regulators to devise actions – including bringing 
pressure to bear, and passing and implementing legislation 
and other measures of control – and strategies to minimise 
surveillance, to make it transparent and to ensure its 
accountability. Resilience requires independent regulators to 
provide oversight, to bring sanctions to bear upon excessive 
surveillance and to influence surveillance plans and practices 
before they are implemented. It also recognises that resilience 
to, and regulation of, surveillance in any single country have 
less of a chance of succeeding without international and 
global co-operation and co-ordination.   
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PART TWO: QUESTIONS FOR INCREASING RESILIENCE IN 
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES  
This part of the handbook presents questions that can be 
considered by stakeholders in different surveillance practices. 
By “surveillance practices”, we refer to the information 
systems, devices and processes that are used to monitor 
people and enable their data to be gathered, analysed and 
applied to individuals or groups of individuals. Stakeholders in 
surveillance practices comprise those who conduct 
surveillance: service providers, governments and the 
consultancies that advise them. Those who seek to regulate or 
critique those practices, such as policy-makers and civil 
society organisations, are also stakeholders. The public – often 
the subjects of surveillance, but also those to whom surveilling 
authorities are answerable – are considered stakeholders as 
well.  
The questions that follow are designed to alert stakeholders to 
the potential harms that may arise from surveillance practices 
so that they can then anticipate, avoid and recover from 
those harms. In other words, they can influence society’s 
resilience to surveillance. Such harmful consequences include 
– but are not limited to – infringement of fundamental rights, 
economic and environmental harms, and social harms such as 
discrimination and the erosion of trust. Some questions are 
generic and applicable across all categories of stakeholders, 
while others are more specific to particular stakeholder groups. 
Some questions are focused upon particular systems, whereas 
others have a more general frame of reference concerning 
society at large. All stakeholders, and not only those 
referenced in this handbook, should ask questions about the 
lawfulness, necessity, proportionality and purpose of 
surveillance systems. They should also question their impact on 
11 
 
society and democratic traditions, and about the measures 
that can be taken to improve resilience. It is not enough simply 
to focus on the infringements of surveillance on individual 
privacy, because the effects of surveillance are felt 
throughout society.  
GENERIC QUESTIONS 
Any stakeholder can ask the following questions of any 
information processing system that involves personal data, 
whether it be an RFID-embedded travel card, a body scanner, 
an identification system, a data profiling system, an 
automated number plate recognition (ANPR) system, a 
location-based service, a CCTV network or a credit scoring 
system. A surveillance system consists of many components, 
technological, human and institutional. Asking questions about 
a surveillance system is most useful before a decision has been 
taken to proceed with it, as happens in a privacy impact 
assessment (PIA). However, many questions are also useful 
when scrutinising an existing system. Reflecting on such 
questions will help to inform stakeholders about a surveillance 
system, its individual and social impacts, and its social, political 
and legal acceptability.  
 With regard to the existing or planned information processing 
system, programme, practice or technology:  
1. What is the purpose of the system? 
2. Is it really necessary? Is it lawful? Is it proportionate to 
the envisaged purpose? 
3. What less intrusive alternatives are available?  
4. Who will develop, operate and authorise it? 
5. Who will have access to the data collected by it? 
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6. How long will the collected data be stored? When 
will the data be deleted? What measures will be put 
in place to store or transmit the data securely? 
7. To what extent will stakeholders, including the 
public, be consulted about it and its effects?  
8. What external oversight is in place, including a 
regular, independent, third-party, publicly available 
audit?  
9. How will system operators be trained so that they 
are sensitive to any harmful consequences?  
10. Does the system enable individuals to be identified? 
If so, is that necessary? Does it provide individuals 
with a means to opt out? 
11. Does the system process “sensitive” personal data? 
If so, is that necessary?  
12. Whose interests does the system serve? 
13. Does the system create identifiable harms, e.g., 
social, environmental, economic or human rights-
related harms? 
14. If surveillance cannot be avoided or its effects 
mitigated, how can society be empowered to build 
capacities to deal with its consequences? 
15. Have the possible negative impacts and risks of the 
implementation or continuation of the particular 
surveillance system been considered? How do these 
relate to the benefits? 
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QUESTIONS FOR POLICY-MAKERS AND REGULATORS   
Policy-makers and regulators, including political parties, 
legislators and the courts, play a crucial role in arbitrating the 
use of surveillance. They are able to develop the legal 
framework and other instruments for keeping surveillance within 
limits that express the principles and values of democratic 
society. The questions below are among the most important 
ones upon which these actors need to focus in shaping their 
legislative, administrative, judicial or regulatory activity. To a 
certain extent, these questions may already form part of policy-
makers’ operational and deliberative practices. They are 
presented with a focus on resilience. These questions are not 
offered as a “check-list” for policy-makers and regulators, but 
rather as a trigger for more reflective self-interrogation and 
modification of practices. They will enable policy-makers to 
consider the wider consequences of surveillance.  
1. Is the surveillance necessary, legitimate, transparent 
and proportional? How are these judgements 
made? Are there any less intrusive alternatives?  
2. How has the decision to use surveillance weighed 
up the costs, benefits and risks, including the 
consequences of surveillance for human rights, 
freedoms and democracy? Is the decision-making 
process publicly documented? 
3. What deliberations have taken place concerning 
the necessity and proportionality of the intrusion into 
individuals’ private lives by means of the 
surveillance measure or policy? Is the decision-
making process publicly documented? 
4. How have the views of different stakeholders, 
especially the public, been taken into account?  
5. Have policy-makers identified potential harms – who 
is harmed by and who benefits from surveillance, 
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what are potential knock-on effects, what are the 
social consequences? After trying to identify all of 
the consequences, have policy-makers thought 
about what they can reasonably do to combat 
those harms? 
6. What systems are in place for adequate supervision, 
review and oversight of surveillance practices? 
7. Have the targets of surveillance (which may be the 
general public) been informed of the existence of 
the surveillance system and its general purpose? 
How can they find out more about the scope of the 
system? How can they seek personal redress for 
harm? How can they question, or fundamentally 
challenge the surveillance system? 
8. How can the political and policy-making process 
best control the proliferation of surveillance?  
9. If surveillance cannot be avoided, how can society 
be empowered to build capacities to deal with its 
consequences? 
10. How are the effects of surveillance to be 
continuously assessed or monitored?  
11. How can international regulatory co-operation and 
standardisation best meet the challenge of the 
global flow of personal information? 
12. How can the political and policy-making process 
best control the proliferation of surveillance?  
13. How can policy-makers and regulators co-operate 
to promote surveillance-minimising good practices 
(or responsible surveillance) at the international 
level? 
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QUESTIONS FOR CONSULTANCIES   
Here, the term “consultancies” applies to a wide range of 
enterprises, from law firms to lobbyists, strategists, media 
advisers and researchers. Consultancies are an interface 
between industry and regulators and represent a stakeholder 
group that does not get much visibility. Consultancies primarily 
serve the interests of their clients, who may have vested 
interests in introducing technologies, products, services or 
other practices that are surveillant in nature. Furthermore, 
consultancies are often required to exercise professional 
judgement in their advice to clients who are introducing new 
information systems, or modifying or extending old ones that 
have a surveillance capability. As a matter of responsibility 
and risk reduction, consultancies can help increase resilience 
to surveillance by reflecting on its harmful consequences and 
by advising clients accordingly. Not only are consultancies 
responsible for providing ethical advice, but also they should 
know what to do if they are subject to scrutiny themselves: 
they need to consider how they manage their own 
information-processing practices.  
1. Does the consultancy provide advice that respects 
and does not infringe the rights and freedoms of 
individuals? Does the consultancy adhere to a 
specific code of practice? Could the code of 
practice be used to consider the likely impact of 
new or existing surveillance practices? 
2. Has the consultancy fostered engagement with 
other stakeholders? If so, how? 
3. Has the consultancy conducted a surveillance or 
privacy and data protection impact assessment? 
Did it recommend engaging with stakeholders as 
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part of the PIA or SIA process, publishing the report 
and submitting it for independent, third-party 
review? 
4. If the consultancy’s advice to its clients were to be 
made public, would it withstand public scrutiny?  
5. Does the consultancy draw to the attention of its 
clients the need to comply with legislation and to 
consider other privacy or ethical risks? 
6. Does the consultancy contact regulators with the 
consent of its clients in order to have a view from 
the regulator with regard to any potential regulatory 
issues relating to the use of surveillance? 
7. Does the consultancy advise its clients on how civil 
society organisations or the media might react to its 
clients’ plans to develop a new surveillance system? 
8. Does the consultancy consider the potential harms 
and consequences of its advice regarding a 
surveillance system? 
9. Does the consultancy counsel its clients about 
measures that they could take to avoid or minimise 
the privacy and other risks that could arise from the 
proposed surveillance system? 
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QUESTIONS FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS  
This handbook uses the term “service providers” to refer to 
private sector organisations that offer goods and services to 
customers. Service providers in the retail, communications, 
social media, travel, financial services and other consumer 
sectors routinely gather and analyse data about their 
customers, as well as about other aspects of their operations. 
This information is then used to inform business processes and 
to differentiate between consumers. This is done in order to 
target consumers with products and services. Because this 
targeting process (called “customer relationship 
management” or “CRM”) gathers information that is then used 
to influence consumer buying behaviour, it is surveillant in 
nature. In some of these sectors, such as social media, the 
analysis and sale of customer data is the core business model. 
Some business sectors, such as travel, communication and 
financial services, are required by law and/or court orders to 
pass customer data to the government for national security 
purposes. This raises a set of concerns not only about data 
sharing and use of customers’ data, but also about how 
customers perceive brands, products and services. 
To increase resilience to surveillance, service providers can 
reflect on the following questions: 
 
1. Has the service provider undertaken a privacy 
impact assessment (PIA) in relation to the customer 
and business information-processing it provides?  
2. Is the profiling and/or monitoring of consumer 
groups (for example, of their behaviour, intention, 
sentiment, location or movements) intrusive? Would 
the service provider be comfortable if this profiling 
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or monitoring was applied to his or her family and 
friends? 
3. How are consumers made aware of their data 
protection and privacy rights when they purchase a 
product or service from the service provider? Has 
the service provider made consumers aware of the 
extent to which it processes information about 
them? What measures has the service provider 
taken to enable consumers to contact the service 
provider for clarification about the information 
collection, processing and sharing it undertakes? 
4. How easy is it for consumers to locate the data 
protection officer in the service provider’s 
organisation and to make a request in respect of 
the information that the service provider holds on 
them? Is the service provider devoting adequate 
resources to ensure its compliance with data 
protection regulation? 
5. In what respects could the service provider improve 
data protection compliance within its organisation 
(for example, in relation to data anonymisation, 
retention, storage, consent, security or data 
protection training)? 
6. Is it appropriate for the service provider to 
undertake branding or marketing activity that 
reinforces privacy as a brand value? How might this 
benefit its market position? 
7. How would consumer trust in the service provider’s 
products or services be affected if it were revealed 
that the service provider had collected and shared 
information about consumers without their 
knowledge? What is the likelihood of this occurring? 
8. In respect of the service provider’s organisation, 
what mechanisms of redress are available to 
customers whose information is incorrect, or has 
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been wrongly or maliciously processed or shared? 
To what extent are the service provider’s customers 
aware of those mechanisms? Are they made 
explicit on the organisation’s website or in 
documentation sent to customers? 
9. Can the service provider envisage how the receipt 
of lower quality or higher priced offers, based on 
customer profiling, may adversely affect the lives of 
different groups of consumers? What alternatives 
are available for disadvantaged consumer groups? 
10. Would the service provider’s segmentation criteria 
be legal when compared to the gender, race, 
disability and age-related discrimination legislation? 
11. If the service provider is required to pass customer 
information to its national government, under what 
circumstances and with what effect can it refuse to 
comply with these requests? Has it ever done so? 
12. Has the organisation been adequately resourced to 
deal with government requests for information?  
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QUESTIONS FOR THE MEDIA  
Although “the media” can refer to specific entities or groups 
(including social media), in the context of this handbook, the 
media is equated with the mass media in a modern society, 
namely, newspapers and journals, television, radio and other 
forms of electronic communication. The term could also 
include all of the channels of communication within a society 
and between societies, as well as the channels that do not 
reach out to many people at once.  
The media is of great cultural, economic and political 
importance in society, and the concept of a free press is a 
cornerstone of modern democracy. The media is especially 
influential in the creation and shaping of public opinion. This 
influence is also exerted upon executive, judicial and 
legislative powers, manifested by the democratic oversight 
and reporting by journalists exercising their right and duty to 
scrutinise. Furthermore, based on their power, the media is 
sometimes referred to as the “fourth branch of government”. 
With regard to surveillance, the role of the media can be 
considered as two-fold: first, the media can be seen as a 
surveillant power, with the responsibility to question and report 
on the central constituent powers in the society. Second, the 
media may engage with the concept and practice of 
surveillance, by raising awareness and building knowledge of 
surveillance and resilience to surveillance in society.   
1. What information concerning the (proposed) 
surveillance systems is available to the public? Is the 
information sufficient, and are the sources diverse 
enough, to carry on journalistic research? Are there 
institutional ways to obtain further relevant 
information? 
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2. How can I use my journalism as a tool for 
knowledge-building and awareness for those within 
the scope of the surveillance? 
3. Am I contributing to the expansion of surveillance 
practices through my work? 
4. Am I devoting enough attention to alternative or 
dissenting views with regard to a (proposed) 
surveillance system, policy or practice? 
5. How can I build on international events and 
development regarding surveillance practices to 
draw attention and raise awareness in my own 
national context?  
6. How can I contribute to a higher degree of 
awareness by shedding light on the widespread 
nature and impact of surveillance in society?  
7. Are there changes happening in my national 
context of which it could be important for the public 
to be made aware, even though the topics may 
not be well received by some policy-makers? 
8. How is surveillance understood in my society? Could 
there be a need for a debate about the very 
content of the term? 
9. How can I engage with relevant authorities in my 
country, such as the Data Protection Authority 
and/or Surveillance Commissioner, with the aim of 
building resilience within the population? 
10. How can my journalism encourage and facilitate 
public debate about surveillance issues? 
11. What are the obstacles I face in investigating 
surveillance practices, and how can I best 
overcome them? 
12. How can I most effectively play a role in voicing 
concerns and stimulating public debate about 
surveillance issues, e.g., sharing information or 
collaborating with civil society organisations? 
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QUESTIONS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS   
In the context of this handbook, we regard civil society 
organisations (CSOs) as those non-profit, non-governmental 
organisations concerned with and by surveillance practices, 
including CSOs that focus on privacy and human and 
fundamental rights as well as those that may be impacted by 
surveillance activities. Examples of the latter may be trade 
unions and student associations. CSOs include formally 
established organisations as well as those that have no formal 
institution – for example, ad hoc groups formed in response to 
a specific surveillance practice or issue. 
Civil society organisations are an important link between 
individuals and other stakeholders, from political institutions to 
companies and the media. While their degree of 
institutionalisation, and their ability to mobilise resources and 
political and media attention vary widely, they offer a forum 
for discussion by participating individuals, and potentially a 
platform to require further information and advance claims. 
1. Are we sufficiently informed about the (constantly 
evolving) nature of surveillance and its effects to be 
able to analyse surveillance policies and 
implementation of surveillance technologies? How 
can we improve our information resources? 
2. Do we have the means (adequate information and 
knowledge) to discern whether and how new 
surveillance measures may touch upon society? Do 
we have the means to assess the potential 
consequences of these measures? 
3. Have we developed adequate resources to 
promote greater public awareness of surveillance 
and means of resisting surveillance? How can we 
improve these resources? 
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4. Are we aware of the institutional and non-
institutional means to resist and overcome 
surveillance? Do we have access to these means, or 
do we have the relevant skills? 
5. Can we exercise any influence to resist the 
introduction of new and objectionable surveillance 
measures, by either the government or companies? 
How? 
6. Have we contributed to the formulation of public 
policies (e.g., via consultations) such that 
surveillance concerns and threats are taken into 
account? Are we able to assess the impact of these 
contributions, and can we improve them? 
7. Have we engaged in any activities that help 
oppose surveillance – e.g., boycotts, campaigns, 
complaints, court challenges, demonstrations? Did 
we make an impact on the decisions? Have we 
developed specific skills? 
8. How is the surveillance policy perpetuating 
vulnerabilities of our societies, contributing to the 
frailty of our democratic practices? 
9. What are the obstacles to our engagement with 
surveillance issues, and how can these best be 
overcome? 
10. How can we most effectively play a role in voicing 
concerns, stimulating public debate, and exerting 
policy influence in relation to surveillance issues? 
11. Are we helping those who have been harmed by 
surveillance (e.g., by providing a platform for 
voicing grievances and supporting their efforts to 
gain redress)? 
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QUESTIONS FOR THE PUBLIC  
Surveillance can be directed at places, events, traffic, crowds 
and even animals. However, the most important and most 
sensitive target in the context of a democratic society is the 
individual. Information about individual consumption patterns, 
communications, financial transactions and location, among 
other things, is stored and analysed in the information systems 
of service providers and government departments.  
Surveillance becomes part of the fabric of everyday life and 
systems that are surveillance-capable become the means by 
which things get done. Most of this surveillance takes place 
out of sight of the individual, who is generally not aware of 
how the collected information is gathered and/or used. 
Because many surveillance practices also confer benefits and 
convenience, such as expedited travel, location-based 
services or customised offers, the public tends to overlook their 
harms. The public then becomes accustomed to living with 
surveillance. As the mechanisms for public scrutiny, such as 
subject access requests or freedom of information, are 
inaccessible to many, surveillance becomes disregarded as 
an issue. However, as soon as the negative consequences are 
felt – unwanted exposure in social media, refused credit, loss 
of privacy, loss of trust in government – members of the public 
become aware of their involvement. To increase resilience to 
surveillance, the public is encouraged to ask the following 
questions to help mitigate, avoid and combat the harmful 
consequences of surveillance practices.   
1. What are the impacts of the proposed (or existing) 
surveillance systems on my life, the life of my family, 
my community, my society? 
2. How can I find out who is responsible for the 
surveillance system, how it works and for what my 
information is used? 
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3. How and where can I find out more about the 
effects of surveillance upon privacy and freedoms 
as well as the ethical and social issues it raises?  
4. How can I learn more about protecting my privacy 
and other fundamental rights while retaining all of 
the benefits of modern information technology? 
5. How can I influence the deployment and use of a 
surveillance system? How can I object to any 
unacceptable or unlawful use of surveillance?  
6. To whom can I complain if I find surveillance 
unreasonable, exaggerated, humiliating or 
discriminatory to me, my family or others? 
7. How can I contact my elected representatives, or 
any organisation representing my rights, in matters 
of unacceptable surveillance plans or practices? 
Are there public consultations or campaigns in 
which I could participate? 
8. What other measures can I take in response to 
surveillance that infringes my rights? 
9. How can I best control information about me (e.g., 
about where I am) when I am online? How can I 
better protect my privacy when online? 
10. Might my use of surveillance devices (e.g., mobile 
phone, video camera) infringe the privacy of others 
or their rights? If so, how should I address this? 
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PART THREE: MEASURES FOR ENHANCING RESILIENCE IN 
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES  
POLITICAL AND REGULATORY MEASURES   
In this section, we focus upon political and regulatory 
measures that could be put in place for enhancing resilience 
to surveillance. They relate to the questions for policy-makers 
and regulators identified in Part Two, most of which involve 
accountability, oversight, principles, and public awareness. In 
this Part, these items are seen in terms of the role they play in 
maintaining or increasing resilience to surveillance.  
ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT 
As mentioned above, resilience to surveillance requires ways 
of preventing, mitigating and remedying the negative effects 
of surveillance. The opacity and non-accountability of much 
surveillance needs to be overcome in order to enable these 
effects to be realised. Resilience includes strengthening laws 
and procedures for accountability and transparency through 
political processes that include review, the exertion of pressure 
from outside and within the institutions of politics and 
government, legislation or other formal rules, the creation of 
independent oversight and sanctions, and the replacement of 
a culture of secrecy and public acquiescence by one of 
openness and criticism. Accountability is more than the 
assignment and acceptance of responsibility for surveillance 
practices; it also requires procedures and rules for reporting 
publicly and engaging in possible challenge to the account 
given. Oversight encompasses part of this latter requirement, 
insofar as oversight is applied by specialised independent 
agencies on behalf of the public. Accountability and oversight 
in any single country will be less successful without international 
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co-operation and co-ordination where surveillance activities 
involve other countries. 
Several of the generic questions in Part Two can be seen 
through the lenses of accountability and oversight. Policy-
makers and regulators should consider measures that clarify 
and reinforce current legislation, compliance and “best 
practice” guidance with regard to the way in which system 
providers and users demonstrate their accountability in terms 
of answering the generic questions posed above. These 
questions closely resemble those that system developers need 
to answer when they conduct privacy or surveillance impact 
assessments, which legislators and regulators should 
encourage where they do not already exist as a statutory 
requirement. Answering these questions and giving accounts 
of performance are more likely to have traction on practice if 
they form part of oversight regimes exercised by regulators or 
their third-party agents. Policy-makers and regulators should 
consider how this oversight can be made more effective. 
The questions as to how societies can best anticipate future 
challenges from surveillance, especially in relation to politics 
and policy formation, are more directly addressed to policy-
makers when they develop policies or laws that involve 
extension or intensification of surveillance, for they ask about 
the consequences for power imbalances and for societal 
resilience to surveillance, and about ways of controlling 
surveillance, which includes oversight. These questions also 
should be answered by regulators, such as data protection 
authorities, concerning their own practices in carrying out their 
enforcement, guidance and awareness-raising roles, and in 
their practical activities at international levels. 
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CONSENT 
The issue of consent is important both in the narrower sense of 
individual consent, but also in the broader sense of societal 
agreement that the state be allowed to undertake 
surveillance on the people’s behalf. Individual consent is not 
an absolute requirement for the lawful processing of personal 
data, although obtaining consent is highly desirable for the 
establishment of confidence between individuals and 
surveillant data-collectors. Consent in regard to mass 
surveillance systems is problematic, especially in the public 
sector where surveillance is carried out for purposes of law 
enforcement and combating criminal and terrorist activities. 
The questions raised above, however, go some way towards 
addressing transparency even if consent is not possible. For the 
private sector, where dataveillance is used for marketing and 
other commercial purposes, required procedures for gaining 
consent already exist but are not always complied with. Policy-
makers and regulators should consider how compliance could 
be improved, whether by increased penalties and sanctions 
for non-compliance or by more effective ways of promoting 
good practice. Where it is not possible, accountability and 
oversight are all the more necessary. It is important too that 
society’s consent to surveillance be sought, since, while states 
may be able successfully to implement secret surveillance 
schemes, once revealed, they risk threatening the legitimacy 
of law enforcement and indeed the political process more 
generally. 
STRENGTHENING LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS OF PRIVACY 
Regulators should ensure that surveillance systems respect 
privacy principles, for example, those referenced in the 
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proposed EU Data Protection Regulation and already in play in 
privacy laws around the world. Principles play a part in 
resilience by providing a normative rationale for judging the 
acceptability of surveillance, on the basis of which opposition 
or adaptation may take place. However, privacy is more than 
data protection: it includes the protection of bodies, spaces, 
movement, thoughts and other types of privacy and freedoms 
from the incursions of surveillance technologies, policies and 
practices. Thus, when assessing surveillance systems, regulators 
should take into account this wider canvas when assessing the 
legitimacy and legality of surveillance systems. Equality is an 
important principle in a democratic society, providing a further 
rationale for resilience or resistance and a criterion for 
evaluating surveillance. Surveillance may lead to 
discrimination and adverse decisions taken against individuals 
and groups in ways that cut across important values of 
fairness, equal treatment and the rule of law, beyond any 
invasion of privacy itself. Generic question 12 and questions 2, 
4 and 11 for policy-makers and regulators highlight the 
relevance of principles and their relation to the proportionality, 
necessity and consequences of surveillance, all of which 
should be taken into serious consideration in policy-making 
and decisions about the legitimacy and exercise of 
surveillance.  
DELIBERATION 
When new surveillance measures are being considered, or 
when existing schemes are being expanded, the deliberative 
and democratic process should be as open, consultative and 
fair as possible. This is the case both in relation to small-scale 
local measures as well as to national (or even transnational) 
systems. The deliberative process enables the voices of 
different parties and interests to be heard, which is important 
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not least because the consequences of implementing 
surveillance schemes are potentially damaging and far-
reaching. Through consultation processes, especially where 
these involve genuine deliberation and frank public discussion, 
the grounds on which the surveillance is to be introduced can 
be heard and assessed, and concerns and objections can be 
addressed. Deliberative processes facilitate public 
engagement and are likely to confer greater legitimacy on 
the surveillance schemes thereby developed. 
AWARENESS AND COMMUNICATION 
Raising public awareness contributes to resilience by 
disseminating important information that provides a platform 
for debate and change. If it is not known who is operating a 
surveillance systems or the extent of surveillance, it is not 
possible to resist or to be resilient. Raising awareness is a 
resilience measure. It is already practiced by regulators such 
as data protection authorities, and is addressed by questions 
2, 3 and 7 for policy-makers and regulators, as well as by the 
generic questions that underpin the accountability procedures 
set out in privacy impact assessment, as mentioned above. 
TEST OF PROPORTIONALITY 
In Europe, the most acknowledged method of legal 
evaluation of conflicts of fundamental rights and legitimate 
interests, such as privacy and security, is the test of 
proportionality. The strict methodology of the test is routinely 
used by courts, including the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), when the courts make decisions on the justifiability of 
concrete cases of restricting fundamental rights, such as the 
application of surveillance measures. If the legitimacy of 
surveillance is questioned, the dispute in most cases is resolved 
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by courts, applying the test of proportionality. In the practice 
of the ECtHR, the emphasis is laid on the last phase of the test, 
that is, the moral balancing between competing rights and 
interests. In order to strengthen the legal requirements of 
introducing or maintaining surveillance measures, European 
courts need to lay more emphasis on the first phases of the 
test, namely, the factual elements of the test of proportionality. 
The same methodology can also be adequately used at the 
level of planning, introducing or increasing individual 
surveillance measures, as research results from the EC-funded 
PRISMS project (http://prismsproject.eu) have shown. 
Regulatory or self-regulatory measures should be taken in 
order to encourage (in certain cases, oblige) stakeholders, 
who are interested in introducing surveillance methods, 
formally and substantially to apply the methodology of the test 
of proportionality. Elements of the test are highlighted above 
in Part Two, both in the generic questions and in the questions 
formulated for policy-makers. 
INDIVIDUAL MEASURES  
As the subjects of surveillance, individuals, their families and 
informal groups may develop strategies and ad hoc measures 
to mitigate the negative effects of surveillance at the 
individual level. One part of these strategies and measures 
can be regarded as resistance, another part as resilience 
towards surveillance. The two notions, resistance and 
resilience, are partly overlapping and sometimes difficult to 
distinguish; however, resistance is understood as active 
opposition, protest, "fighting back", while resilience as a 
property of the individual or group makes them capable of 
tolerating stresses and shocks, recovering from these harmful 
impacts and learning from earlier experience. 
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The precondition of resistant or resilient measures is that the 
affected individuals perceive surveillance, or perceive the 
surveillant elements in their everyday lives. Some forms of 
surveillance, such as the use of polygraphs or body scanners, 
are easy to comprehend, while widely used forms of computer 
communication and Internet use may not reveal their inherent 
surveillant elements to most users. It is important that the 
subjects of surveillance, even if they are unable to oversee all 
possible implications of surveillance practices, be aware of the 
potential of the surveillance practice concerned. 
RADICAL SOLUTIONS 
On the side of active protest, some people may destroy CCTV 
cameras, generate black-outs or use microwave jamming to 
distort communication channels of surveillance equipment. No 
matter how spectacular these militant actions may be, the 
perpetrators are committing criminal offences. 
Those who prefer to stay within the borders of legality may still 
choose a radical solution: retreating from modern urban 
society, living in remote rural areas, hiding from satellite 
photography, not using the Internet and mobile phones – 
however, such solutions might result in disproportionate 
disadvantages to such individuals and other members of 
society. 
People who, for whatever reason, do not want to be subjects 
of face recognition systems and thus social sorting may use 
hats and sunglasses to cover their faces; demonstrators 
sometimes use identical masks in order to make themselves 
unidentifiable.  
Activist-minded people, or NGOs acting on their behalf, may 
call other people's attention to CCTV cameras or other 
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surveillance practices, making them visible or even ironic or 
laughable. 
RESILIENT ATTITUDES 
People who do not want to give up the advantages of 
modern information and communication technologies may still 
choose not to use tracking services or smartphones, unless it is 
really necessary for them. Others, who are aware of the 
profiling capabilities and techniques of service providers, may 
occasionally give false data about themselves where giving 
real names and other personal details is not a precondition of 
using a particular service. 
Users of modern services need to consciously distinguish 
situations when they really need targeted and custom-tailored 
business offers and when this is not necessary or even 
disadvantageous to them; they need to distinguish cases 
when they really need location-based services, such as finding 
a nearby shop, and when they do not want to be tracked. In 
the latter case, users should switch off tracking devices and 
applications, log out from temporarily unnecessary networks or 
remove the battery from their phones. People who use 
passports or other ID documents with built-in radio frequency 
identifiers (RFID chips) should use a protective cover (known as 
a Faraday shield), which avoids unnecessary identification 
and tracking, and open it only when it is necessary to use the 
document. 
A simple and customary way of reducing the level of profiling 
of mobile phone users is to use multiple phones and swap the 
pre-paid cards between their own phones and the phones of 
others. Pre-paid cards provide fewer possibilities for profiling 
than subscription phones. 
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PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 
Users of Internet-based and/or mobile networks and services 
should be aware of, and use, privacy enhancing technologies 
(PETs) and services. Some PETs help users to mitigate individual 
harmful effects, offering, for example, cookie management 
tools, anonymous browsing options, non-tracking search 
engines or snoop-proof e-mails. Other PETs offer system-level 
solutions, such as the TOR network, which provides anonymous 
communication channels, or the so-called private or attribute-
based credentials, which allow individuals to use only the 
necessary amount of identifying information required for using 
a service. The third group of PETs, visualization programs and 
applications – such as the ones which show the real route of e-
mails or reveal what others can see about you on the Internet 
– do not solve any practical problem in relation to surveillance 
but make them visible, thereby helping the users to make 
informed decisions. 
In general, a conscientious citizen living in an urban 
environment, and a conscientious user of modern 
communication services, should not live under the "tyranny of 
convenience". In order to mitigate harmful effects of 
surveillance, she should be able to fade into the mass of users, 
to be part of a large anonymity inside of which everybody has 
the same attributes. She should also be careful not to infringe 
other people's privacy or dignity simply by using convenient 
and trendy equipment, for instance, by taking pictures of her 
neighbours and posting them on social networks.  
In sum, individuals must not develop paranoia when using 
services with surveillance capacities, but should have a 
realistic sense for judging the benefits and harms of 
surveillance, as well as their longer-term implications. With this 
approach, they can actively reduce the negative side effects 
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of surveillance technologies and equipment in their own local 
or virtual environment. 
SOCIETAL MEASURES  
The opinions and actions of opinion leaders, celebrities, 
teachers, activists and artists can have an impact on a 
societal level. As an outstanding example, Edward Snowden's 
brave disclosure of the secret services' mass surveillance 
practices conducted far beyond the constitutional and 
legitimate borders was a revelation for many people and 
generated critical opinions worldwide. 
If such impacts promote the critical evaluation of surveillance 
and the clear distinction of its advantageous and harmful 
effects, then the activities of these influential persons can 
contribute to making our present surveillance societies more 
democratic, more lawful and ethically more acceptable. 
Conversely, if such personalities, driven by interests or 
conviction, exert an opposite influence on public opinion, then 
their views may reinforce the disadvantageous impacts and 
harmful effects of surveillance. That is why society's critical 
thinking and reactions are of utmost importance in such 
matters. 
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES AS COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 
If many individuals respond the same way to the same 
surveillance challenges, they can exert a societal influence 
even if they are not organisationally co-ordinated. Certain free 
services, such as Change.org, can facilitate the collecting and 
forwarding of such responses of individuals. Virtual advocacy 
networks and blogs publicising surveillance practices may be 
regarded as intermediate forms between individual and 
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organised responses; however, organised collective actions or 
protest movements can also grow out of such individual 
responses. 
A less spectacular but rather efficient kind of individual 
response exerting large-scale impact is the consequent 
change of consumer behaviour. If users of Internet-based and 
mobile services preferred less surveilling (or more privacy-
friendly) services and service providers, or boycotted privacy 
intrusive ones, despite seemingly advantageous marketing 
offers, such actions would certainly change the business 
model of such services, resulting in the decrease of the harmful 
side effects of surveillance. 
DEMONSTRATIONS 
Demonstrations against surveillance belong to the most 
radical and spectacular forms of societal measures, which can 
have a direct impact, amplified by the media, on legislation 
and regulation, and their enforcement, as well as on public 
opinion and individual behaviour. Since surveillance itself, and 
in particular the asynchronous use of personal data in 
computer networks, is an abstract notion, members of the 
public may have difficulties in understanding its nature and 
implications. Civic organisations may act as intermediaries and 
help people understand surveillance practices and organise 
demonstrations, as happened in Germany where tens of 
thousands of protesters demonstrated on the streets of Berlin 
against the EU Data Retention Directive and against 
surveillance. 
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SPECIFIC GROUPS WITH A BIG IMPACT 
Certain social and professional groups may have an impact 
on surveillance societies bigger than their proportion of the 
population. One such group is the community of IT 
professionals. As Lawrence Lessig famously noted, in modern 
information societies, "the Code is the law", that is, the de 
facto lawmakers are the coders: the IT specialists who design, 
implement and maintain information systems, including 
surveillance systems. This is why other members of society need 
to learn, and influence, their views on this subject matter. 
Studies of IT professionals' views on surveillance have shown 
that these professionals are more critical towards built-in 
surveillance capabilities of the information systems they are 
required to design and operate than may be generally 
assumed. It is therefore important to demonstrate to these 
specialists that society expects them to create a world through 
the systems they design in which they would happily live as 
private individuals, too. 
Similarly influential can be the non-governmental organisations 
specialised in information rights and freedoms, or consumer 
protection groups, together with their supporters, not only 
through organising demonstrations but also through publicising 
the location and functioning of CCTV cameras on their 
websites, as has happened in Milan and Budapest, among 
other cities. 
SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY 
The two notions, surveillance and democracy, can easily be 
regarded as contradictory, even antagonistic. However, as 
Haggerty and Samatas (2010) show, there exist surveillance 
practices that may fit into a democratic, rule-of-law society, 
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provided that such systems comply with the fundamental 
legal, ethical and procedural requirements of such societies. In 
addition, the connotation of surveillance is different across 
countries and cultures, as are the social and political traditions 
even in liberal democracies. Citizens of former dictatorships or 
authoritarian regimes may be less sensitive to surveillance 
practices, or concentrate only on state surveillance while 
being negligent towards new business-driven forms of 
surveillance. However, a lower level of sensitivity in society 
does not decrease the responsibility of those who introduce or 
operate surveillance systems, with special regard to 
globalisation trends that decrease differences among 
surveillance techniques, practices and ideologies worldwide. 
SOUSVEILLANCE, EQUIVEILLANCE 
An activist approach rather more idealistic than a realistic 
societal measure is the so-called "sousveillance", that is, 
surveillance from below, or counter-surveillance, or "watching 
the watchers". While it is an inevitable component of a 
transparent and accountable surveillance system to provide 
channels through which the subjects can receive information 
about the surveillance practices, such actions, mainly in the 
domain of visual surveillance (for example, demonstrators 
using their mobile phone cameras to photograph police using 
cameras to surveil protestors), may serve as an awareness-
raising tool rather than a real societal response to surveillance 
which, according to their proponents, would finally reach an 
equilibrium of surveillance powers, "equiveillance". 
SURVEILLANCE AND ART 
The positive and negative ideas constructed about 
surveillance, curiosity and fear, trust and distrust, relationships 
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between individuals, between state and society, are reflected 
in the media, popular culture and various artistic genres. 
Successful mainstream films, fiction and non-fiction can have a 
significant impact on public opinion, thus indirectly on the 
regulation and practice of surveillance. Although the "Big 
Brother culture" of reality shows may downplay the serious 
nature of surveillance, socially responsible art films, together 
with advocacy or activist films, may counterbalance this 
effect. There are artists, works of art and even artistic genres 
whose central theme is surveillance and being under 
surveillance. This specific branch in contemporary art is often 
called Surveillance Art, and its creators surveillance artists. 
Experimental films and alternative art have a relatively small 
and specialised audience; however, they can also have an 
impact on people's approach toward surveillance at the 
societal level. 
PUBLIC OPINION 
Surveys, quantitative and qualitative methods of measuring 
public opinion, constitute an important element of democratic 
governance. Pro- and anti-surveillance interest groups and 
advocates equally like to refer to the findings of such surveys. 
Pro-surveillance forces are particularly keen on quoting survey 
results proving that people do not take an interest in 
protecting their private sphere and do not oppose increasing 
surveillance practices. However, as Raab and Szekely have 
shown in the EC-funded PRISMS project, both the media and 
various interest groups have a tendency to cherry-pick the 
research findings that best support their own views, and to 
accept these partial results as scientific evidence. 
In addition, in a democratic society there are limits even to 
majority opinions, policies and regulations must not reflect the 
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majority's views exclusively. Not infrequently, the minority must 
be protected from the majority and, under some 
circumstances, it may even become necessary to defend 
certain fundamental values, such as privacy, against the 
majority public opinion. 
AN ACTIVIST PRESS 
The free press is a precondition but is not in itself a satisfactory 
safeguard against the harmful effects of surveillance 
practices. Since the media in liberal capitalism is often subject 
to financial and other influence by the government and 
business entities, including those who have vested interests in 
increasing surveillance, the presence of an activist-minded 
press is indispensable for making these practices known, 
accountable and subject to criticism.  
* 
Societal measures are interrelated with both regulatory 
measures and the behaviour of individuals. All these potential 
measures can contribute to influencing regulation, enforcing 
transparency and accountability of surveillance, and tilt 
power asymmetries more toward individuals.  
 
 
 
